Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons
War Crimes Memoranda

War Crimes

2005

Can The Former Iraqi Leaders Responsible For The Establishment
Of The Revolutionary Command Council Court And The Ministry
Of Interior Special Court, As Well As The Members Of Those
Courts Themselves, Be Properly Tried For Crimes Within The
Jurisdiction Of The State Of The Iraqi Special Tribunal?
James Zink

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/war_crimes_memos
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Zink, James, "Can The Former Iraqi Leaders Responsible For The Establishment Of The Revolutionary
Command Council Court And The Ministry Of Interior Special Court, As Well As The Members Of Those
Courts Themselves, Be Properly Tried For Crimes Within The Jurisdiction Of The State Of The Iraqi Special
Tribunal?" (2005). War Crimes Memoranda. 154.
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/war_crimes_memos/154

This Memo is brought to you for free and open access by the War Crimes at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in War Crimes Memoranda by an authorized
administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES RESEARCH LAB

MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICE OF THE
PROSECUTOR OF THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL

ISSUE:
CAN THE FORMER IRAQI LEADERS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND
COUNCIL COURT AND THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR SPECIAL
COURT, AS WELL AS THE MEMBERS OF THOSE COURTS
THEMSELVES, BE PROPERLY TRIED FOR CRIMES WITHIN THE
JURISDICTION OF THE STATE OF THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL?

______________________________________________________

Prepared by James Zink
Fall 2005

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES…………………………………………………………….ii
I.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS................................ 1
A.

ISSUES................................................................................................................... 1

B.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................... 2
1. The Attacks on the Shiite Muslims May Be Tried as Crimes Against
Humanity under Article 12 of the IST Statute....................................................... 4
2. The Attacks on the Shiite Muslims Cannot Be Tried as Genocide or War
Crimes because the Prima Fascia Elements Cannot Be Satisfied. ....................... 5
3. As Evidenced By “The Justice’s Case” From the International Military
Tribunal, Individual Justices of the Iraqi “Special Courts” Involved Can be
Held Accountable Under the Doctrine of Superior Orders In the Commission of
Crimes Against Humanity Against the Shiite Muslims......................................... 5
4. The IST Statute and Relevant International Case Law Finds the RCC Can
Be Held Accountable Under the Doctrine of Superior Orders in the
Commission of Crimes Against Humanity. ............................................................ 6

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND................................................................................... 7
III. LEGAL DISCUSSION ........................................................................................... 10
A. The response to the Shiite uprising and the crimes within the jurisdiction of
the IST.......................................................................................................................... 10
1.

Genocide........................................................................................................... 11

2.

War Crimes ..................................................................................................... 14

3.

Crimes Against Humanity.............................................................................. 18

B.

The crimes of the Iraqi Special Courts judges under the IST jurisdiction ... 29

C.

The crimes of the RCC under the IST jurisdiction ......................................... 34
1. Article 14(a) ......................................................................................................... 34
2. 15(b)(2) and Command Responsibility ............................................................. 36

IV. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 39
Chart 1………………………………………………………………………………..…39
i

Index of Authorities
Treaties and other International Instruments
1. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/imtconst.htm
2. Control Council Law No. 10, available at
http://www.yale.edulawweb/avalon/imt/imt10.htm
3. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277
4. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, March 23, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171
5. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), open
for signature Dec. 7, 1979, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 16 I.L.M. 1391
6. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II),
open for signature June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 16 I.L.M. 1442
7. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General pursuant to Paragraph 2
of Security Council Resolution 808, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/25704 (May 3, 1993)
8. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF,183/9, art.
126 at 87 (1998)
9. The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
U.N.S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(1993), amended by U.N.S.C. Res. 1166, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3878th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1166 (1998)
10. The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda, U.N.S.C. Res. 955,
U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., at art. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994)
11. The Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, available at http://www.cpairaq.org/human_rights/statute.htm
Court and Tribunal Cases
12. Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. C.H.R., 55/97, OEA/Ser.L/V?II.98,
doc. 6 rev. (Apr. 13, 1998)

ii

13. Judges’ Trial – The United States of America v. Josef Altstoetter, et al., 6 LAW
REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS (United Nations War Crimes
Commission, 1948)(U.S. Mil. Trib. 1947)
14. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (ICTR Trial Chamber
Sept. 2, 1998)
15. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment (ICTY Appeals Chamber
July 29, 2004)
16. Prosecutor v. Du[Ko Tadi], Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment (ICTY Appeals
Chamber July 15, 1999)
17. Prosecutor v. Du[Ko Tadi], Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment (ICTY Trial Chamber
July 15, 1999)
18. Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10, Judgment, (ICTY Trial Chamber Dec.
14, 1999)
19. Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-A, Judgment (ICTR Trial
Chamber, June 1, 2000)
20. Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment (ICTR Trial
Chamber, May 21, 1999)
21. Prosecutor v. Kordić, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment (ICTY Trial Chamber,
February 26, 2001)
22. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment (ICTY Appeals
Chamber June 12, 2002)
23. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment (ICTY Trial Chamber
February 11, 2001)
24. Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, Judgment and Sentence (ICTR
Trial Chamber Jan. 27, 2000)
25. Prosecutor v. Pavo and Zanga , Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment (ICTY Trial
Chamber Nov. 16, 1998)
26. Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment and Sentence (ICTR
Trial Chamber Dec. 6, 1999)
Journals and Law Review Articles
27. Payam Akhavan, Contributions of the International Criminal Tribunals for the
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda to Development of Definitions of Crimes Against
Humanity and Genocide, 94 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 279-283 (2000)
iii

28. Mohamed Elew Badar, From the Nuremberg Charter to the Rome Statute:
Defining Elements of Crimes Against Humanity, 5 San Diego Int’l L. J. 73 (2004)
29. Simon Chesterman, An Altogether Different Order: Defining the Elements of
Crimes Against Humanity, 10 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 307
30. Robert Cryer, A “Special Court” for Sierra Leone?, 50 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 435
(2001)
31. Mirjan Damaska, The Shadow Side of Command Responsibility, 49 Am. J. Comp.
L. 455-496 (2001)
32. Phyllis Hwang, Defining Crimes Against Humanity in the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, 22 Fordham Int’l L.J. 457 (1998-1999)
33. Daniela Kravetz, The Protection of Civilians in War: The ICTY’s Galic Case, 17
Leiden J. of Intl L. 521 (2004)
34. Major Bruce D. Landrum, The Yamashita War Crimes Trial: Command
Responsibility Then and Now, 149 Mil. L. Rev. 293-301 (1995)
35. Guenael Mettrraux, Crimes Against Humanity in the Jurisprudence of the
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, 43
Harv. Int’l L.J. 237 (2002)
36. Marisa Miraldi, Overcoming Obstacles of Justice: The Special Court of Sierra
Leone, 19 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 849 (2003)
37. David L. Nersessian, The Countours of Genocidal Intent: Troubling
Jurisprudence from the International Criminal Tribunals, 37 Tex. Int’l L.J. 231
(2002).
38. Darryl Robinson, Defining “Crimes Against Humanity” at the Rome Conference,
93 Am. J. of Int’l L. 43-57 (1999)
39. Michael P. Scharf, Have We Really Learned the Lessons of Nuremburg?, 149 Mil.
L. Rev. 65-71 (1995)
40. Michael P. Scharf, Defining Terrorism as the Peacetime Equivalent of War
Crimes: Problems and Prospects, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 359, (2004).
41. Cecile Tournaye, Genocidal Intent Before the ICTY, 52 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 447
(2003)
42. Greg R. Vetter, Command Responsibility of Non-Military Superiors in the
International Criminal Court (ICC), 25 Yale J. Int’l L. 89 (2000)
Miscellaneous/Websites
iv

43. AllRefer.com, Iraq’s Revolutionary Command Council, available at
http://reference.allrefer.com/country-guide-study/iraq/iraq67.html
44. CNN.com, Iraqis uncover thousands in mass graves, available at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/05/14/sprj.irq.main
45. Country Studies, Iraq – The Judiciary, available at
http://countrystudies.us/iraq/74.htm
46. Global IDP Project, Iraq: insecurity and lack of shelter exacerbate internal
displacement crisis, available at
http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/IdpprojectDb/idpSurvey.nsf/SearchResults/F3
98638656ECBBC4C1257037004100D2?OpenDocument
47. Holocaust Encyclopedia, Law and the Third Reich, available at
http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/article.php?lang=en&ModuleId=10005467&printing
=yes
48. Holocaust Encyclopedia, Subsequent Nuremburg Proceedings, Case #3, The
Justice Case, available at
http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/article.php?lang=en&ModuleId=10007073
49. Holocaust Encyclopedia, Subsequent Nuremburg Proceedings, Case #11, The
Ministries Case, available at
http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/article.php?lang=en&ModuleId=10007082
50. Holocaust Encyclopedia, Subsequent Nuremburg Proceedings, Case #12, The
High Command Case, available at
http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/article.php?lang=en&ModuleId=10007083
51. Human Rights Watch, Background: Repression of the 1991 Uprising, available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/iraq0503/4.htm
52. Human Rights Watch, Endless Torment: The 1991 Uprising in Iraq and Its
Aftermath, available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/Iraq926.htm
53. Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Background on Human Rights Condition, 1984-1992,
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/iraq/
54. International Committee of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law –
Treaties and Documents: Iraq, available at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/Pays?ReadForm&c=IQ
55. People’s Daily News, Over 3,000 Bodies Exhumed from Mass Grave in Iraq,
available at
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200305/15/eng20030515_116686.shtml
56. The State.com, Former minister denies Shiite uprising role, at
http://www.thestate.com/mld/state/news/nation/11999097.htm
v

57. Sun-Sentinel.com, Thousands of bodies found in mass grave, available at
http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/nationworld/iraq/balte.graves14may14,0,800552.story
58. The Washington Post Online, The Ghosts of 1991, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A108742003Apr11?language=printer
59. The Washington Times Online, History’s Shadow on Iraq’s Shiites, available at
http://www.washtimes.com/upi-breaking/20040405-014556-5453r.htm
60. Wikipedia, Judges’ Trial, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/judges%27_trial

vi

I.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. ISSUES *
Following the Gulf War of 1991, Shiite Muslims in Southern Iraq rose up and

began violent protesting and insurrection.1 In addition to providing a military and police
response, the Revolutionary Control Council (RCC) used its authority to establish certain
“Special Courts” (Special Courts), and, along with the Revolutionary Control Council
Court (Revolutionary Court), which began handing down execution and indefinite jail
sentences for violations of national security to lists of hundreds of people at a time. 2 The
Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) was given jurisdiction to hear cases concerning crimes
against humanity, genocide, war crimes and select Iraqi laws that took place between
1968 and 2003. 3 The purpose of this memorandum is to determine whether the judges of
the Special Courts and the RCC officials can be held accountable for any of the crimes
*

Under the former regime, special courts were established throughout Iraq to summarily try and execute
opponents of the former regime. For example, the former regime established a court known as the
Revolutionary Command Council Court. That Court answered to Iraq’s highest executive organ (the
Revolutionary Command Council) and summarily tried and executed tens of thousands of individuals
allegedly responsible for participating in the 1991 Shiite uprising. In that Court, like the Ministry of Interior
Special Court which was set up to execute 44 Merchants allegedly responsible for rising food prices after
UN sanctions were imposed, orders consist of one line which stated something to the effect that, the
following people are hereby found guilty of violating Iraq’s national security. Sometimes, a list of hundreds
of names would follow (including children) of people who were executed immediately thereafter. Some
have posited that it might be possible (relying, in part, on the IMT’s [Judge’s] Case) to charge those with
command and control over these “Special Courts” and the members of the Courts themselves with crimes
against humanity and/or other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Statute of the Iraqi Tribunal. In essence,
one would place the entire Special Court system on trial. Please explain whether this line of thinking is
supported by the Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal and relevant case law. In fleshing out this point, it is
important to note that the Special Court system in Iraq was set up as soon as the new regime was
established and ended when the regime fell. Thus, their creation and operation is not directly linked to an
ongoing armed conflict. They were an institutional part of the regime. And they were used by the regime at
different times for different purposes.

See Human Rights Watch, Endless Torment: The 1991 Uprising in Iraq and Its Aftermath, available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/Iraq926.htm. [hereinafter Endless Torment][Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 52]
1

2

Id.

3

Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/human_rights/Statute.htm.
[hereinafter IST statute] [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11]

1

within the jurisdiction of the IST statute based on their role in the Former Iraqi regime’s
violent response to the Shiite uprising.
B. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
1. The Attacks on the Shiite Muslims May Be Tried as Crimes
Against Humanity under Article 12 of the IST Statute.
The IST is allowed to hear cases of crimes against humanity under Section 12 of
the IST statute. According to the statute, to establish crimes against humanity took place,
the prosecution must prove that there was a widespread or systematic attack against a
civilian population. Crimes against humanity may come in 11 forms under the statute, but
this memo focuses on: extermination, imprisonment, and enforced disappearance.
International case law states that crimes against humanity indeed occurred during the
suppression of the uprising of the Shiites by the former Iraqi regime.
2. The Attacks on the Shiite Muslims Cannot Be Tried as Genocide
or War Crimes because the Prima Fascia Elements Cannot Be
Satisfied.
The attacks likely did not amount to Genocide or War Crimes as the offenses are
defined in the IST statute. One of the three commonly accepted elements of Genocide is
that there be an intent to destroy the protected group in question. 4 Due to the Shiites
uprising, it should be difficult to argue that the intent of the former regime was to destroy
the Shiites based on their religion or culture, rather than quall the conflict.
Similarly, it is unlikely any war crimes occurred either. While there were battles
going on during the uprising, war crimes generally refer to larger battles between states
sustained for longer periods of time instead of the wholly internal, somewhat isolated

4

IST statute, supra note 3, at art. 11. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11]

2

conflicts in Iraq. 5 International case law suggests war crimes are not a viable option for
these circumstances.
3. As Evidenced By “The Justice’s Case” From the International
Military Tribunal, Individual Justices of the Iraqi “Special
Courts” Involved Can be Held Accountable Under the Doctrine of
Superior Orders In the Commission of Crimes Against Humanity
Against the Shiite Muslims.
The Judge’s Trial during the Control Council Law10 Trials held that judges can
be accountable for human rights violations even if they were following the law of their
land. 6 The case also held that following the law in situations where the judges knew or
should have known they were in participants in the greater Nazi plan of murder and
unlawful imprisonment made those judges just as accountable as any other official that
added to the overall policy. 7 Similarly, in the case at hand, the judges of the Special
Courts will not be able to shield themselves from liability by claiming they were
following the law. Article 15(c) reiterates this position by providing for liability for
anyone who orders a crime against humanity to take place. 8
4. The IST Statute and Relevant International Case Law Finds the
RCC Can Be Held Accountable Under the Doctrine of Superior
Orders in the Commission of Crimes Against Humanity.
Under Article 14(a) of the statute, anyone who interferes with the judiciary that is
outside of the judiciary can be held accountable for his actions. 9 While additional facts

5

IST statute, supra note 3, at art. 13. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11]

See Judge’s Trial – The United States of America vs. Josef Alstoetter, et. al., 6 LAW REPORTS OF
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 40, 58-59 (U.N. War Crimes Commissions, 1948)(U.S. Mil. Trib. 1947).
[hereinafter Judge’s Trial][Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 13]
6

7

Id.

8

IST statute, supra note 3, at art. 15(c). [ Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11]

9

IST statute, supra note 3, at art. 15. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11]

3

are needed to determine the outcome in any particular case, it is within the scope of the
IST jurisdiction to prosecute RCC members affecting judicially independent decisions,
namely influencing Special and Revolutionary Court judges to issue mass executions and
arrests against the Shiites.
Article 15(b)(2) also provides an option for prosecuting the RCC officials. 10 If it
is discovered that the RCC threatened or bribed judges of the Special Courts, then they
can be held accountable for those crimes under superior resonsibility. The prima fascia
elements of superior responsibility are satisfied if an individual knew or had reason to
know that the justices planned order atrocities, but did nothing to stop or reprimand the
actions.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Shiite-Sunni conflict is one that ranges back to the end of the British

occupation of Iraq 40 years ago. 11 During the occupation, the British government
appointed the Sunni Muslims to rule on their behalf, leaving the Shiites mostly powerless
and isolated in southern Iraq. 12 Eventually, the Sunni Establishment created the RCC, an
executive organizations that quickly infiltrated all three branches of government and
began running Iraq more like an oligarchy. 13 In addition, the president of the government
was selected by the RCC. 14 The RCC had the power to sign treaties, declare war, deal

10

IST statute, supra note 3, at art. 15(b)(2). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11]

The Washington Times Online, History’s Shadow on Iraq’s Shiites, available at
http://www.washtimes.com/upi-breaking/20040405-014556-5453r.htm. [hereinafter History’s
Shadow][Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 59]
11

12

Id.

13

Id.

4

with national security matters, and it was charged with representing the will of the
people. 15
More importantly, the president and RCC had the power to establish new courts to
deal with national matters ranging from civil litigation to treason. 16 All of the judges for
these courts were appointed by the president, most likely after being approved by the
RCC. 17 Matters of national security were generally brought before the Revolutionary
Court to be dealt with, but the RCC had on occasion established Special Courts to help
deal with national security matters as well. 18 Under the jurisdiction of the secret police,
the Revolutionary Court and Special Courts were closed to the public and offered no
appeal process for those found guilty. 19 Sentences ranged from one year in jail to
execution on the spot. 20
Not surprisingly, the RCC established Special Courts to deal with internal unrest,
which was put into effect to deal with the Shiite uprising following Operation Desert
Storm. 21 Following the retreat of the Iraqi military from Kuwait, the Shiite Muslims in
southern Iraq were encouraged by former President George H.W. Bush to “take matters
AllRefer.com, Iraq’s Revolutionary Command Council, available at
http://reference.allrefer.com/country-guide-study/iraq/iraq67.html. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 43]
14

15

Id.

Country Studies, Iraq – The Judiciary, available at http://countrystudies.us/iraq/74.htm. [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 45]
16

17

Id.

18

Id.

19

Id.

Human Rights Watch, Background: Repression of the 1991 Uprising, available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/iraq0503/4.htm. [hereinafter Background] [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 51]
20

21

History’s Shadow, supra note 11. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 59]

5

into their own hands to force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside”. 22 The Shiites
murdered around 150 suspected Baathist agents before the security and armed forces of
the government began to put down the uprising. 23 The governmental forces opened fire
on residential areas, indiscriminately killing countless unarmed civilians. Chemical
weapons were used, water was contaminated and revered Shiite officials were
assassinated. 24 The military and security forces also burned whole villages to the ground
and randomly arrested and detained thousands of Shiite Muslim men, women and
children. 25 The Shiites were routinely brought before the Special Courts in droves and
sentences without being afforded the right to even speak in their defense. 26
After the initial quelling of the violence, the human rights violations did not
stop. 27 The random arrests and disappearances continued, followed by mock trials. 28
People were rounded up and executed within massive pits that would become their
graves. 29 Those that were not killed by the gunfire were buried alive with the dead

22

Background, supra note 20. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 51]

23

Id.

Global IDP Project, Iraq: insecurity and lack of shelter exacerbate internal displacement crisis, available
at
http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/IdpprojectDb/idpSurvey.nsf/SearchResults/F398638656ECBBC4C1257
037004100D2?OpenDocument. [hereinafter Shelter][Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 46]
24

Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Background on Human Rights Condition, 1984-1992, at pp. 8-11, available
at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/iraq/. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 53]
25

26

Id.

27

Background, supra note 20. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 51]

28

Id.

See Sun-Sentinel.com, Thousands of bodies found in mass grave, available at http://www.sunsentinel.com/news/nationworld/iraq/bal-te.graves14may14,0,800552.story. [hereinafter Mass
Graves][Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 57]
29

6

bodies. 30 Recently, these mass graves have been discovered, some with an estimated
3,000 bodies in a single pit, and around 15,000 bodies in the area. 31 The total estimate of
deaths is 100,000, 32 with another 100,000 to 200,000 displaced from their homes in the
southern marshlands. 33
This memo will assume the fighting on the part of the Shiites had mostly halted
when these alleged violations occurred. In addition, it only addresses whether judges of
the Special Courts and the RCC can be brought before the IST, but cannot address
individual factual circumstances and chances for successful prosecution. The type of
general facts necessary for conviction will be mentioned where it is pertinent and
available.
III.

LEGAL DISCUSSION
A. The response to the Shiite uprising and the crimes within the jurisdiction
of the IST.
The IST was established to have jurisdiction over serious crimes occurring in Iraq

between July 16, 1968 and May 1, 2003. The scope of the crimes is limited to:
genocide, 34 war crimes, 35 crimes against humanity, 36 and certain Iraqi national crimes. 37

30

Id.

See CNN.com, Iraqis uncover thousands in mass graves, available at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/05/14/sprj.irq.main. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 44] See also People’s Daily News, Over 3,000 Bodies Exhumed from Mass Grave in Iraq,
available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200305/15/eng20030515_116686.shtml. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 55], Mass Graves supra note 29. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 57]
31

The Washington Post Online, The Ghosts of 1991, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wpdyn/A10874-2003Apr11?language=printer. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 58]
32

33

Shelter, supra note 24. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 46]

34

IST statute, supra note 3, at art. 11. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11]

7

As such, in order for jurisdiction to be proper in front of the IST, the evidence must
demonstrate a violation of one of the aforementioned crimes that occurred between the
dates listed above. In addition, the statute of the IST specifically states that precedent
from prior international tribunals is considered highly persuasive because the case law
and statutes from those tribunals are thought to codify customary international law. 38
1. Genocide
Article 11 of the IST statute defines “genocide” as the following:
any of the following acts commited with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part,
a national, ethnical or religious group, as such:
1. killing members of the group;
2. causing serious bodily or mental harm to the members of the group;
3. deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part
4. imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and
5. forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
35

Id. at art. 12.

36

Id. at art. 13.

37

Id. at art. 14.

IST statute, supra note 3, at art. 17(b) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11] See Report
of the Secretary General pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoce/basic/statut/s25704.htm. Compels the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia to use only “rules which are beyond any doubt part of customary international law”
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 7]; Contra Michael P. Scharf, Have We Really Learned
the Lessons of Nuremburg?, 149 Mil. L. Rev. at p. 68 (1995). Scharf points out that “such recognition [of
individual responsibility for internal armed conflict under the Geneva Convention] would constitute
progressive development of international law, rather than an acknowledgement of a rule that is beyond
doubt entrenched in existing law.” [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 39]; Judge NietoNavia dissented in Galic, stating that the law must be qualified under customary international law before it
can be applied. Scholar justifies the court by applying same standard used to extend under Scharf’s
example. Daniela Kravetz, The Protection of Civilians in War: The ICTY’s Galic Case, 17 Leiden J. of Intl
L. at p. 527 (2004). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 33].
38

8

The IST adopted these provisions because Iraq is a party to the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which was ratified in the country
on January 20, 1959. 39 The exact application of the convention is a bit unclear. In order
to understand how it applies, previous case law in prior international tribunals addressing
the crime of genocide should be used. 40
In order to be found guilty of genocide, someone must: (1) commit one of the
offenses listed, (2) have that act be against a member of a protected group and (3) be of
the intent to destroy that group in whole or in part. 41 Of the three requirements, the first
is the easiest to prove. There is ample evidence that the security and military forces killed
many Shiites south of Baghdad. As such, the first element, that is, killing members of the
group, is satisfied.
The second element is also likely to have been met. Shiite Muslim should be a
protected class as defined under the IST. 42 More specifically, the Shiites should qualify
under the religious group criteria of the statute. 43 In order to meet this requirement,
scholars have noted that the ICTR has used a standard based on practice, not subjective
belief. 44 Such criterion makes sense, as it provides a better objective evidentiary basis for

39

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, found at
http://www.hrweb.org/legal/genocide.html. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3];
International Committee of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law – Treaties and Documents:
Iraq, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/Pays?ReadForm&c=IQ. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 54]
40

IST statute, supra note 3, at art. 17(b). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11]

Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10, Judgment, para. 62 (ICTY Trial Chamber Dec. 14, 1999).
[hereinafter Jelisic] [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 18]
41
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IST statute, supra note 3, at art. 11(a). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11]
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Id.
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its holding over the subjective thoughts of the individual. Because the Shiites share
similar religious practices of their religion, they will likely be found to be a protected
group. 45
The last element, however, is likely to be difficult to prove. There needs to be
intent on the part of the individual in question. 46 The Jelisic court held that in order to
meet the mens rea requirement, the perpetrator must hold the goal of destroying in whole
or in part the group in question. 47 Of course, the actual mental state of the individual at
the time of the violation is next to impossible to attain, so courts must allow inferences in
order to come to a determination. 48
Courts in the ICTR and ICTY have set out criteria evaluated during trial,
including number of victims, 49 discriminatory targeting, 50 and any additional testimony
about prior conduct by the individuals in question. 51 While the facts can supply some
basis for meeting these criteria, the additional fact that, at least at first, there was an
uprising where the Shiites killed hundreds of suspected Baathist officers makes it

David L. Nersessian, The Countours of Genocidal Intent: Troubling Jurisprudence from the
International Criminal Tribunals, 37 Tex. Int’l L.J. 261 (2002). [hereinafter Countours] [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 37]
44
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It should also be noted that no objective standard has been set by the courts for qualifying a group. As
such, circumstances determine each group’s standing. Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T,
Judgment and Sentence (ICTR Trial Chamber Dec. 6, 1999). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at Tab 26]
46

IST statute, supra note 3, at art. 11(a). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11]
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Jelisic, supra note 41, at para. 66. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 18]

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment at para. 523 (ICTR Trial Chamber Sept. 2,
1998). [hereinafter Akayesu] [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14]
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Jelisic, supra note 41, at para. 81. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 18]

Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-A, Judgment at para. 158-159 (ICTR Appeal Chamber,
June 1, 2000). [hereinafter Kayishema Appeal][Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 19]

50
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unlikely that a clear intent can be established. Even with the large numbers of Shiites
killed as evidence, 52 the clear intent to destroy in whole or in part becomes difficult to
separate from the necessity for national security. It must be proven that it is the aim of the
individual to destroy in all or in part. 53 The inevitability of the consequences of the
actions is not enough to reach the standard of intent. 54
In conclusion, there is no doubt that the Iraqi forces killed members of a group, as
required under article 11 of the IST. 55 In addition, the Shiites qualify as a protected group
under the IST. 56 However, as there was an uprising, those involved can argue protection
of national security to avoid the “clear intent” to destroy all or in part of the protected
group, 57 thereby avoiding the third criteria for genocide. 58
2. War Crimes
War Crimes, as defined under Article 13 of the IST, are any of the following
crimes that occur during an armed conflict: (1) Grave breaches of the Geneva Convention
of 12 August 1949; (2) other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in
international armed conflict; (3) acts committed against persons taking no active part in
the hostilities; and (4) serious violations of the laws and customs of war applicable in

Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment at para. 533 (ICTR Trial Chamber, May 21,
1999).[hereinafter Kayishema Trial] [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 20]

52

Cecile Tournaye, Genocidal Intent Before the ICTY, 52 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. at. p. 450 (2003).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 41]
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Id.

55

IST statute, supra note 3, at art. 11(a). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11]
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Akayesu, supra note 48, at para. 521. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14]
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armed conflict not of an international character. 59 As stated, the overall circumstance that
must occur for liability under article 14 is that the violation must happen during an
“armed conflict.” 60 Beyond that stipulation, deciding which rule applies depends upon
more extensive details, such as who are the victims of the violations and the nature of the
conflict itself. 61
The term “armed conflict” is by no means a settled one in international customary
law. As such, many times it is either obvious that an armed conflict had occurred (i.e. the
war within the former Yugoslavia) and it is up to the states to decide if a situation
qualifies as an armed conflict. Some have even argued that single attacks can rise to the
level of an armed conflict if the size of the attack is great enough. 62 In addition, a high
number of people involved in the attack is not necessary. 63
There have been, however, efforts by the various international tribunals to define
armed conflict. The ICTR, for example, has defined armed conflict as “the existence of
open hostilities between armed forces, which are organized to a greater or lesser
degree.” 64 Additionally, the ICTR has held that in order to differentiate an internal
conflict that qualifies as a war crime from those that are “situations of internal

59

60

IST statute, supra note 3, at art. 13. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11]
Id.
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In the four areas defined as “War Crimes” under the IST, different circumstances trigger different
provisions of the article. The provisions require that it be determined if the armed conflict was of an
international or internal nature. In addition, the victims of the crimes must be recognized as civilians or
combatants to determine which provision to use.
Michael P. Scharf, Defining Terrorism as the Peacetime Equivalent of War Crimes: Problems and
Prospects, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 359 (2004). [hereinafter Defining Terrorism] [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 40]
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Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, Judgment and Sentence at para. 248 (ICTR Trial
Chamber Jan. 27, 2000) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 24].
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disturbance,” four criteria need to be met: be under responsible control; exercise control
over part of a territory, carry out sustained and concerted military operations; and be able
to implement the Protocol. 65 Other courts have held that small groups battling can
constitute an armed conflict, especially if there are military objectives involved. 66 In
addition, some scholars argue that terrorism could be seen as a type of armed conflict that
could raise the crime to the level of a war crime. 67
For the purposes of prosecuting the judges and the RCC for war crimes, it will be
difficult task prove there was an armed conflict going on in Iraq at the time at the time
their crimes took place. Most of the arrests and execution judgments appear to have come
after the open hostilities between the Shiites and the former Iraqi regime had ended. An
argument could be that as the arrests were inextricably linked to the hostilities and would
not have taken place but-for the up rise. 68 While this may be true, it still is not likely

Kayishema Trial, supra note 52, at para. 171. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 20];
Protocol II to the Geneva Convention was created for protection of individuals during a purely internal
armed conflict, which is where this standard originates. It also notes “this protocol shall not apply to
situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated or sporadic acts of violence and other
acts of similar nature, as not being armed conflicts.” Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II),
open for signature June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 16 I.L.M. 1442. [hereinafter Protocol II][ Reproduced
in the accompanying notebook at Tab 6]
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Scharf notes that the Inter American Commission on Human Rights held that a battle between a group of
42 men and the military was an armed conflict as needed for war crimes. The court argued that as it was an
attack on a military institution (the group had taken over a barracks) it could be seen as an armed conflict,
even though it was a small number of combatants. Defining Terrorism supra note 62, at p. 366.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 40]; Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am.
C.H.R., 55/97, OEA/Ser.L/V?II.98, doc. 6 rev. (Apr. 13, 1998). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 12]
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The ICTY has held that the time in which the armed conflicts occur do not have to be the same as the
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No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment at para. 573 (ICTY Trial Chamber July 15, 1999). [hereinafter Tadic
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enough to provide for a war crime, as it is unlikely the court will find the conflict
between the Shiites and the former Iraqi regime to be of the nature to qualify for a war
crime. The battles took place within a month, so they were not over an extended period of
time, nor would it appear there were specific military objectives considered in the battles.
The court could still find it to be a military conflict, as there still is no internationally set
definition, but the weight of the evidence does not seem to rise to the level of past cases,
and, as such, war crimes becomes a difficult case to prove.
Establishing that the crime in question is related to the armed conflict is the
second criteria for proving a war crime. 69 The analysis must show that the crime(s) of the
individual(s) in question must somehow be related to the armed conflict. This standard
differs from crimes against humanity as it does not need to be committed against
numerous people to be considered part of the armed conflict.70 It need only occur once,
but it must have some relation to the overall armed conflict within the country.
If the tribunal were to hold that the up rise was an armed conflict, the crimes that
followed could be shown to be in connection with the armed conflict. The arrests and
executions ordered by the judges (and influenced by the RCC) would be seen as
furthering and legitimizing the armed conflict, thereby being inevitably related to it.
Determining whether the Iraqi conflict was an internal or international conflict
will determine what crimes are applicable to the situation, assuming the prior two
requirements are met. Sections (a) and (b) of Article 13 of the IST statute apply to

“must be an obvious link between the criminal act and the armed conflict” Prosecutor v. Pavo and
Zanga, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment at para. 193 (ICTY Trial Chamber Nov. 16, 1998). [hereinafter
Pavo][Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 25]
69
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The requirements have no mention of plurality necessary, but only that the crime be somehow connected
to the armed conflict and be in violation of one part of the article.
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international conflicts. 71 On the other hand, section (d) applies to internal conflicts, which
must be large scale and be between two large and organized groups (i.e. rebels,
revolutionaries, or the state government itself).72 Section (c) can apply to both internal
and international conflicts.
It would be difficult to classify the Shiite uprising as an international conflict, as
both groups involved came from within Iraq. As such, the crimes delineated in sections
(c) and (d) would apply here. Under article (c), passing judgment without due process is
considered a war crime. 73 This article seems most applicable in the case against the
judges. Most of the other articles deal with intentional killing or injuring civilians and
property. While this case did have many killings amongst the Shiites, it is difficult to
differentiate the motive and behind those deaths as being a protection of national security
or having intent to kill civilians. As such, it is difficult to apply the rest of the articles to
the judges.
In any case, the crime of removing essential judicial processes is a crime of
internal conflict under the war crimes provisions of the IST statute. Again, it must be
shown that there was in fact an armed conflict, that the crime was somehow related to the
conflict and that it in fact is an internal conflict. In addition, war crimes only require that
the actor knows they are acting in the furtherance of the crime, not that they know the
backdrop of armed conflict in which these crimes are commited.
3. Crimes Against Humanity

71

IST statute, supra note 3, at art. 13(a) and (b). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11]
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Id. at 13(c).
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IST statute, supra note 3, at art. 14(c). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11]
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Under Article 12, 74 crimes against humanity are defined as:
Any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:
1. Murder
2. Extermination
3. Enslavement
4. Deportations or forcible transfer of population
5. Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of
fundamental norms of international law
6. Torture
7. Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, or any other
form of sexual violence of comparable gravity
8. Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial,
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender or other grounds that are
universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in
connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal
9. Enforced disappearance of persons and
10. Other inhumane acts of a similar character causing great suffering, or serious
injury to body or to mental or physical health.
The definition used by the IST comes from the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) 75 , which includes a much more encompassing description of
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IST statute, supra note 3, at art.12 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11]
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crimes against humanity than any of the previous tribunal statutes. For instance, the
ICTY has a limiting requirement that there exist an armed conflict in connection with the
crime against humanity, 76 and the ICTR has required some discriminatory basis for the
attacks. 77 While some of the requirements from previous tribunals have been trimmed
away, the precedent set by those tribunals still set the standard for understanding what
constitutes crimes against humanity.
In order to qualify as a crime against humanity, five “general elements” must be
met: “(1) there must be an attack; (2) the acts of the perpetrator must be part of the attack;
(3) the attack must be directed against any civilian population; (4) the attack must be
widespread or systematic; and (5) the perpetrator must know that the acts constitute part
of widespread or systematic crimes directed against a civilian population and know the
acts fit into such a pattern.” 78 Noticeably missing from these requirements is a nexus
between the act and an armed conflict, which had been present in the definition since the
Nuremburg Charter. 79 The nexus requirement was intentionally left out of the Rome
Statute, as the majority of the delegates decided that such a requirement would effectively
75

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF,183/9 (1998). [hereinafter Rome
Statute] [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 8]
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The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, U.N.S.C. Res. 827, U.N.
SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), amended by U.N.S.C. Res. 1166, U.N.
SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3878th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1166 at art. 5 (1998). [hereinafter ICTY statute]
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9]
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The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda, U.N.S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th
Sess., 3453rd mtg., at art. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 at art. 3 (1994). [hereinafter ICTR statute] [Reproduced
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Mohamed Elew Badar, From the Nuremberg Charter to the Rome Statute: Defining Elements of Crimes
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in the accompanying notebook at Tab 28]; Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment at
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Charter of the International Military Tribunal, available at
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make crimes against humanity subsumed by the concept of war crimes. 80 In other words,
in times of peace crimes against humanity can arise. 81
(a) There must be an attack
The first step is to provide that one of the 10 categories of recognized attacks
under the ICT are met. 82
What exactly is meant by “attack”? The ICTR held that an attack consists of any
conduct that involves the commission of violence. 83 This violent commission is different
from an armed conflict in that it, in and of itself, is not a crime against humanity, but
merely the precursor to its commission. A violation of the laws of war during an armed
conflict, however, can be a war crime on its own. 84 While war crimes can entail attacks
on civilians during a conflict, if it is before or afterwards, then it would only qualify as a
crime against humanity so long as it is not connected to the conflict itself. 85 It should also
be noted that an attack under this definition can be non-violent in nature, whereas war
crimes are not generally referred to in such a manor.

Elements of Crimes, supra note 78, at pp. 95-96. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 28];
Phyllis Hwang, Defining Crimes Against Humanity in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, 22 Fordham Int’l L.J. at p. 460 (1998-1999). “Because crimes against humanity were prosecuted
along with other crimes, the Nuremburg Tribunal often failed to clarify the content or the scope of crimes
against humanity, in particular, the distinction between this crime and war crimes. . .” [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 32]
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Darryl Robinson, Defining “Crimes Against Humanity” at the Rome Conference, 93 Am. J. of Int’l L. at
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IST statute, supra note 3, at art. 12(a). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11]

Guenael Mettrraux, Crimes Against Humanity in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, 43 Harv. Int’l L.J. 244 (2002). [hereinafter
Jurisprudence for ICTY ICTR] [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 35]
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Under the IST, three separate categories would likely be used to charge the
Special Court judges and the members of the RCC: Extermination, Imprisonment or other
severe deprivation of physical liberty in the violation of fundamental norms of
international law and Enforced disappearance of persons. 86
(1) Extermination
It should be noted that the article immediately before Extermination is Murder. 87
The difference between these two charges, as the ICTR points out, is the scale of the
crimes. 88 The ICTR The Trial Chambers in the ICTR have adopted a two prong test for
determining if extermination has taken place. The accused, by his or her acts or
omissions, contributed directly to the mass killing of others on a large scale. The
contributions of the accused do not need to be the sole factor in the death of individual,
but only contribute to it. In addition, the perpetrator can either have intent, knowledge, or
be negligent in their commission of the crimes. 89
The large scale criteria has included groups as few as 16 people, 90 so with
thousands killed, it is not a difficult argument to make that the criteria is met. In addition,
the soldiers, judges and RCC members must be shown to have participated or somehow
contributed to the deaths of the individuals. 91 Since the courts were handing out

IST statute, supra note 3, at art. 12(a)(2), 12(a)(5) and 12(a)(9). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 11]
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Id. at art.12(a).
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Kayishema Trial, supra note 52, at para. 142. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 20]

Simon Chesterman, An Altogether Different Order: Defining the Elements of Crimes Against Humanity,
10 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. at p. 338 [hereinafter Altogether Different Order] [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 29].
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Akayesu, supra note 48, at para. 735-44 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14].
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documents with thousands of names on it at a time, it is likely they had the necessary
knowledge and contributed directly to the deaths of the Shiites.
(2) Imprisonment
This violation is in reference to depriving individuals arbitrarily of their due
process. 92 Essentially, as due process is a guaranteed right under the ICCPR, 93 the
country which limited that right must give ample justification for doing so. 94 To
determine this, the court looks at factors like whether the detainee was held on the basis
of national security necessity and whether or not the safeguards were there for release
once the supposed security crisis had passed. 95 Of course, these uses must occur in the
context of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population. 96
Again, if the court looks at the situation at hand, it could come to the
determination that at the beginning of the conflict, the arrests were temporarily necessary
to regain public order. Even if that assumption is granted, people were arbitrarily
imprisoned well after the up rise and tried with little to no due process. The lack of due
process cannot be justified by security concerns, and the charge can stand against
whoever was involved in the imprisonments, including the judges.
(3) Enforced disappearance
Altogether Different Order, supra note 89, at p. 337. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
29]
91

Jurisprudence for ICTY ICTR, supra note 83, at p. 288 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 35]
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, March 23, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 at art. 9.
[hereinafter ICCPR] [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 4]
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Id. at art. 4.

Prosecutor v. Kordić, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, at para. 302 (ICTY Trial Chamber, February
26, 2001). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 21]
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The final count to be used for the purposes of this memo is enforced
disappearance. 97 Important to note on this count is that there is no modern case law on
the subject because it is a newly delegated option under the ICC statute. 98 Since the ICC
is only supposed to reflect customary international law and not create new law, the
delegation at the Rome Conference justified the addition by stating that it had always
been amongst the “other inhumane acts” section. 99 To qualify, the accused must: (1)
abduct, arrest or detain a person; (2) by, or with the authorization, support, or
acquiescence of a State or political organization; (3) followed by a refusal to
acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or
whereabouts of those persons; and (4) with the intention of removing them from the
protection of the law for prolonged periods of time. 100
The scarcity of case law provides the IST with a wider discrepancy for defining
the crime of enforced disappearance as compared to the other crimes listed that have
appeared in previous international tribunal statutes. 101 The intent of the judges of the
Special Courts and the members of the RCC can be inferred from their actions.
Imprisonment would provide for those that were not brought to court after arrest. As
stated before, those that were brought in most cases did not receive proper protection
under the law, but, if some had not been brought to court at all, the crimes against them
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IST statute, supra note 3, at art. 12(9) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11].
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Defining CAH, supra note 81, at p. 56 n.76. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 38]
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Defining CAH, supra note 81, at p. 56 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 38].
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would not fall under the category of imprisonment. This provision, however, captures
those that were held without a court date, assuming their status was kept hidden from the
public. 102
(b) The acts of the perpetrator must be part of the attack
Case law holds two requirements for proving that the accused is part of the attack:
the nature of the act which, by its very nature or consequence, is liable to have the effect
of furthering the attack and knowledge by the accused that there is an attack on the
civilian population that they are a part of. 103 In other words, the actions of the accused
must both actually be part of the attack in general and they must have knowledge that
their actions are part of a greater attack going on. 104 Some note that if a policy is present
from a government or organization and it is that policy that instigated the acts, then the
relation requirement can be met without difficulty. 105 The knowledge requirement makes
sure that the accused has the mens rea necessary for actual guilt. Other courts have held
that in addition to knowledge, willful blindness also satisfies this requirement. 106
With judges, military, secret police, courts and politicians being presumably
involved, it is a hard argument to make that those who killed and imprisoned the large
number of Shiites did not know that their actions were part of a grander scheme. It is also
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Many Shiites arrested in mass sweeps in southern Iraq never saw the inside of a courtroom. This
provision is applicable to those that were held with no trial or that were tortured and/or killed upon being
arrested.
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment, at para. 434 (ICTY Trial Chamber February
11, 2001). [hereinafter Kunarac Trial][Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 23]
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just as difficult to show that any actions taken over that period of time against Shiites was
not some type of policy decision, since, as will be discussed later, the attacks were so
pervasive and expansive. As such, this requirement is met.
(c) The attack is directed against a civilian population
There is some confusion as to just what jurisprudence to follow in order to
determine what “directed against” is supposed to mean. While there is consensus that a
civilian population is the focus of the attacks, there is a split as to whether it “refers to the
attack [itself] or to the specific intent of the perpetrator.” 107 Blaskic in the ICTY held that
the intent of the accused is what is important, 108 whereas the courts in Tadic and
Kumarac have held that the attack only need be focused on a population regardless of the
intent of the individual. 109 While most cases follow the latter standard, having prior case
law does at least open the door to the possibility of the court accepting the former
argument.
The other part that needs to be delineated is just what a civilian population is. The
generally accepted definitions stem from Additional Protocol I of the Geneva
Conventions. 110 Additional Protocol I applies to international armed conflicts and
defenses a “civilian” as anyone not in the armed forces. 111 Note that those who have

Jurisprudence for ICTY ICTR, supra note 83, at p. 253. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
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Altogether Different Order, supra note 89, at p. 323. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
29]

110

111
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means of controlling and inflicting force, such as the police, are not considered a civilian
in the strictest sense. 112 In times of war, anyone not directly involved in the fighting on
either side is considered to be a civilian. 113 In addition, when in doubt, one is to side
cautiously and assume citizenship until proven otherwise. 114 Factors such as combatants
amongst a crowd of civilians or if one had been involved in the battle but had laid down
arms does not take away civilian status. 115
Whether crimes against humanity took place really turns to the question of
whether the Shiites are afforded civilian status. From the recorded history, it appears that
the Shiites were rebuffed within a month of their uprising. During that time, they would
likely be found to be combatants, unless the number of Shiite uprisers was decisively
smaller than the general population of Shiites in southern Iraq. It is up to the court to
determine the proper ratio necessary for deeming a crowd of civilians as a crowd of
revolters. Even if the court were to find that during the actual uprising, there were too
many Shiites fighting for this standard to be met, the actions taken well after the incident
would qualify as attacks on a civilian population based on the unqualified mass arrests
and executions.
(d) The attack was widespread or systematic
The fourth criterion includes a disjunctive test requiring that the attack either be
widespread or systematic. As noted by scholars, it is this requirement that raises what
would normally be a crime within the jurisdiction of a municipal jurisdiction to the
112
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jurisdiction of the international tribunals. 116 Widespread is defined as “massive, frequent,
large-scale action.” 117 In addition, the test for a widespread attack only means that an
individual perform a prohibited crime that is part of the larger scale attack, not
necessarily that he perform a widespread attack on his own. 118 This does not, however
mean that the attacks must be in a large area, but can also be commited in single towns or
villages if the violations were grave enough. 119 Systematic, on the other hand, refers to
the “organized nature of the acts of violence and the improbability of their random
occurrence.” 120 In addition, the Akayesu court held that there must be thorough
organization with a pattern towards a policy using some of the resources available to the
organization. 121 This distinction, however, may be a moot point, as only one case has
specifically sited one without the other. 122
In any case, the attacks against the Shiites could qualify under both. The large
number of people killed gives weight to a widespread argument, and the fact that the
judiciary was used to give official weight to the atrocities committed could imply some
type of governmental plan to use the up rise as an excuse to go after the Shiites in the
south.

Payam Akhavan, Contributions of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda to Development of Definitions of Crimes Against Humanity and Genocide, 94 Am. Soc’y Int’l L.
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(e) The perpetrator must know that the acts constitute part of widespread or
systematic crimes directed against a civilian population and know the acts fit
into such a pattern
Article 7 of the Rome Statute holds that the perpetrator must have knowledge that
his attack occurred in the context of widespread or systematic crimes against civilian
populations. 123 In other words, if the actor had no idea that his act was taken in
connection with a widespread or systematic attack, then he could not be found guilty. 124
It should also be noted that willful blindness also qualifies as knowledge for these
purposes. 125 This requirement does not replace motive, but only provides that the accused
knew of the widespread or systematic attacks and participated in a crime that could be
attributed to those attacks. 126
As noted by scholars, it is a very difficult for the defense to prove that the accused
had no knowledge of the widespread or systematic attacks going on around them. 127 In
this case, an uprising of a very large population in the south, followed by mass killings
and arrests would make it impossible for anyone to not know the types of abuses going
on in the area. In addition, if government officials are implicated, they were the ones
organizing and executing the actions, making the mental element satisfied.
B. The crimes of the Iraqi Special Courts judges under the IST jurisdiction
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All of the evidence preceding this section set up jurisdiction for the court to hear,
and likely convict, for crimes against humanity that occurred following the up rise of the
Shiites in 1991. There can be little doubt that the acts committed against them were of
such magnitude to reach the jurisdiction of the IST. The purpose of this memo, however,
is not only to determine if a crime against humanity existed, but whether the judges and
the RCC can be charged for these crimes. The accountability of the RCC will be
evaluated in the next section, but because the charges against them depend largely on
whether the judges through which they acted can be tried, the fate of the judges is
discussed first.
The functions of the judiciary are supposed to be separate from the legislative and
executive branches of a prototypical government. Unlike the latter two, the judiciary is
generally there to interpret the law, not to create or enforce it. As such, holding a judge
accountable for following the laws he had no part in enacting could be seen as
problematic for some. In this case, however, there is strong precedent from some of the
first military tribunals in Nuremburg that a judge following laws and orders that go
against customary international law can be just as liable as any other individual before a
tribunal.
The Justice’s case took place following the fall of the Nazi regime and the
establishment of the International Military Tribunal (IMT). 128 This case was governed
under Control Council Law No. 10 (CCL10) as opposed to the Charter of the IMT which

For simple background, See Holocaust Encyclopedia, Law and the Third Reich, available at
http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/article.php?lang=en&ModuleId=10005467&printing=yes. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 47]; Holocaust Encyclopedia, Subsequent Nuremburg Proceedings, Case
#3, The Justice Case, available at http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/article.php?lang=en&ModuleId=10007073.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 48];Wikipedia, Judges’ Trial, at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/judges%27_trial. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 60]
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had handled previous cases. 129 The difference between the two jurisprudences is pertinent
to the case at hand, as the only change from the IMT charter to the CCL10 is under
crimes against humanity. Under the IMT charter, there had to be a connection with an
ongoing conflict for the prior, but no such requirement was in the CCL10 charter. 130 The
difference meant that under the CCL10, a person could be charged with crimes against
humanity for acts that had no connection to an ongoing conflict. 131 While the ICTY and
ICTR both derogated back to the IMT charter by holding that some connection to an
armed conflict was necessary, 132 the IST and ICC have both adopted the view set out in
the CCL10. 133 In other words, both the IST and the ICC do not require the precursor of
an armed conflict in order to try and individual for crimes against humanity. In addition,
while the language and enumerated crimes may differ slightly, both tribunals provide
similar definitions for crimes against humanity. 134 These factors add weight to the
persuasiveness of the legal analysis in the case.
In Justice’s, the tribunal was asked to decide if judges under the Nazi Reich could
be held liable for crimes against humanity under the CCL10 statute. From the time they
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took power, the Nazi regime established different courts (People’s Court, Special Courts,
Hereditary Health Courts) and were often staffed by judges or lay persons of the
government’s choosing. 135 How the courts functioned varied. 136 The court hearings many
times would last minutes with judgment coming immediately after and with no real
opportunity for a defense to be presented. 137 Most importantly, in all of its dealings, the
courts would often issue penalties including death, life sentences or castration. 138
The resemblance to the case in Iraq is striking. The facts show that the RCC set
up some courts during times it deemed dangerous for national security while it also had
some courts that lasted throughout the existence of the RCC itself. The RCC appointed
the judges to their seats. The courts withheld numerous due process rights under the guise
of national security. Using this expedited process, they sentenced thousands of people to
death, including young children, without providing defendants with any opportunity to
defend themselves.
There are also some important differences to be considered. While both had some
type of conflict, (whether or not the up rising was an armed conflict, as stated before, is
undecided) the Iraqi courts did focus on individuals from the group that was involved in
attacking the government. The Jews in Germany, however, were clearly persecuted for
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who they were, not for engaging in a violent uprising. The crimes against humanity
charge, again, turns on whether the IST believes that the judges were acting within the
necessary means to perform their function of national security, or if they should have
known that what they were doing was against customary international humanitarian law.
It seems fairly obvious, though, that when the judges began handing down judgments on
groups of people at a time and issuing execution orders for women and children that had
not even appeared before the court, they used the law to further the plan against the
civilians.
From the disturbing practices stated above, the IMT determined that the German
judges could be held liable for their part in sending people to the concentration camps,
ordering sterilization, or sentencing them to death. 139 Essentially, the courts reasoning
was that at some points, there are atrocities so disdainful that international law allows
other countries to prosecute the violators, especially if the home country is supporting the
violator or is unwilling to prosecute themselves. 140 The principle has become more and
more widely accepted, and the law has gradually been expanding to the point where
CCL10 was 80 years ago, in allowing the prosecution of crimes against humanity without
a direct connection to an armed conflict. 141 In addition, the court reasoned that the justice
system was so perverted from what anyone could call fair or just that it in itself was
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creating crimes against humanity. 142 As such, participation in it, whether by choice or by
threat, constituted complicity that is unacceptable under international humanitarian
law. 143 In other words, being threatened or staying in the position because they felt they
could be fairer than a more biased judicial appointment from the Reich was no
justification for following such laws. It would be the same as a soldier not being liable
because he felt threatened or believed that he would keep the body count down if he were
the soldier involved than if he were not.
To protect themselves, the judges argued that they were only doing their job and
following the law, much as these judges will likely do. 144 However, if they are found
liable for crimes against humanity, it means they had some knowledge (or should have
had some knowledge) that what they were doing was clearly a violation of customary
international law. They cannot claim they were just following the law, as the IMT held
that the laws of Germany were not a justifiable reason for complicity in these heinous
crimes. 145 Nor could anyone simply claim they were following orders, as such
information does not alleviate guilt, but could serve only to provide mitigating
circumstances at sentencing according to the CCL10 statute. 146 Finally, they most
certainly could not claim their government position as a means of escaping culpability, as

Judge’s Trial, supra note 6, at p. 984. “The very essence of the prosecution’s case is that the laws, the
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“[i]t can scarcely be said that governmental participation, the proof which is necessary for
conviction, can also be a defense to the charge.” 147
This precedent sets up the case against the judges in Iraq. The same restriction on
justifications exists in the IST statute as did in the CCL10 statute. 148 Consequently, the
only way the judges can get out of the crime is by proving they do not meet the standards
of crimes against humanity in the first place. Without that, the precedent set by Justice’s
provides the need for accountability from the judiciary so long as they are found
responsible for the death and disappearance of thousands of people. 149
C. The crimes of the RCC under the IST jurisdiction
1. Article 14(a)
Article 14(a) creates a unique situation not yet addressed by previous tribunals in
that it provides jurisdiction for the IST to hear cases in violation of select Iraqi law 150 .
More specifically, Article 14(a) holds that those who attempted to influence or
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manipulate the judiciary are in violation of the Iraqi constitution. 151 It is difficult to assess
potential guilt beyond the actual text for a number of reasons. First, while this is an
international tribunal, the IST will be considering the national law of Iraq. As noted
earlier, the IST is to use precedent from the other tribunals as persuasive, but that has
always been on the basis that the tribunals were hearing cases involving settled
customary international law and making judgments based on that settled international
law. Whether the courts will attempt to apply previous international legal analysis from
those cases is unknown.
Given these confounding factors, it is best to ere on the side of caution and
determine liability according to the text of the IST statute. With that standard in mind, the
members of the RCC are likely to be found liable. So long as there is proof that members
of the RCC took specific actions to interfere with the judiciary. Assuming there can be a
showing of specific illegal acts, the other difficult question arising from the statute is
whether there can be group liability for a single action. The language of the statute offers
no limiting language that would prescribe it only to individuals, but, in the converse, also
offers no language that specifically relates it to a group of people taking action to
influence the judiciary. As such, the statute can at least be argued to apply to both
individuals and groups. It would be likely that, based on most standards for group
actions, the members of the group would need intent towards the actions taken against the
judiciary. Article 15 provides that an individual is culpable if he “contribute[s] to the
commission . . . of a crime by a group of persons acting with common purpose. Such
contribution shall be intentional and shall either: be made in the knowledge of the
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intention of the group to commit the crime.” 152 This standard provides two forms of
knowledge necessary: intent to contribute to the commission of a crime and knowledge
that the group intends to commit the crime. 153
Judging by most historical references to the RCC under the Baathist Regime, it is
highly unlikely that if some of the members took actions against the judiciary that all the
members did not both intentionally contribute to the commission of that act and know
that the group was actually committing the crime. Thus, if instances of interference in the
judiciary can be attributed to a member or multiple members of the RCC, they should be
held liable under Articles 14(a) and 15(b)(4)(I).
2. 15(b)(2) and Command Responsibility
The doctrine of command responsibility has been around since the times of
Nuremburg. 154 While the standards to convict under command responsibility have
changed since then, 155 the tribunals have maintained the reasons why leaders need to be
held accountable. 156 The IST has adopted the similar language as prior tribunals for
command responsibility. 157
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Article 15(b)(b)(2) provides that anyone who “orders, solicits or induces the
commission of a crime” is just as guilty as the person actually doing the act. 158 This
standard is generally referred to as direct command responsibility. 159 Along with that
standard, the IST removes head of state immunity as a defense to the crimes within its
jurisdiction. 160 Combine these two standards and, if there is proof that the RCC either
implicitly or explicitly ordered the Special Courts and the Revolutionary Court to
facilitate these horrendous acts, the case is made for superior orders and the members of
the RCC would be just as guilty as the person that did the arresting, exterminating or
detaining.
Even if, however, the proof only shows that the RCC had knowledge of what was
happening with the courts, they can still be held liable for imputed command
responsibility. 161
a. Superior-subordinate relationship
This criterion is easily satisfied. The RCC was the highest ranking governmental
organization for the time in question. In addition, it was the RCC and the president that
placed the judges in their positions and that created special courts for security purposes. It
can be assumed that the RCC also had the power to influence the judges through threats
156
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and bribes. They also probably had the power to sanction or remove judges from posts if
need be. Case law points out that the accused must have effective control over the
subordinate in order to be liable under Article 15(b)(2).162 While facts need to be
gathered to support or refute this claim, it is logical that the RCC had effective control
over the courts based on the amount of influence they have in the creation of and
appointments to the courts.
b. Knew or had reason to know
Case law holds the standard to be either knowledge or willful ignorance/
blindness. 163 This standard, as set up by the courts, holds that either the superior knew of
what the subordinate was doing, or had the information presented to him that could have
informed him of what was happening had he been doing his job. 164 This ruling essentially
creates an affirmative responsibility for those in superior relationships to be informed of
the actions of their subordinates. 165 Further factual inquiry is necessary to determine if
the RCC had or should have had knowledge of the actions of the subordinate.
c. Failure to punish
The last requirement is that the superior did not take actions to stop or punish the
individual once they gained knowledge of the violations. 166 As the superior is in the
effective control as stated earlier, he should be able to control his subordinate through
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order or punishment. 167 Once that requirement is met, along with the knowledge
criterion, the superior has the affirmative duty to interfere when his subordinate attempts
to commit a violation, or at least punish the subordinate properly when a violation
occurs. 168 If the superior does nothing, he is vicariously liable for the actions that he
could have stopped. 169 Assuming the first two criteria are met, the RCC would be liable
for the actions of the judges since they held a superior relationship to them, knew or
should have known of the judges’ wrongdoings and did nothing to stop them.
IV.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, crimes against humanity and abuse of power can be brought under

individual criminal responsibility, and genocide and war crimes should be left for other
defendants.
While the IST has jurisdiction over four major international crimes, there are only
two that should be used in charging the judges of the Special Courts and the members of
the RCC in this case: crimes against humanity and the abuse of power laws or Iraqi
national laws. The long list of Shiite names, both child and adult, on arrest and execution
warrants combined with little to no due process and arbitrary punishment form the basis
for charges under crimes against humanity.
In addition, the RCC can be held accountable under Article 14(a) if there is
evidence that they took part in influencing the independence of the judiciary. Because
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there is question of how international law effects the application of the Iraqi laws, a
textualist approach should be used. Under such an approach, convictions are likely.
Genocide cannot be brought as the intent to destroy the group cannot be proven.
The uprising provides a secondary justification that should be enough to prevent
genocidal intent from being proven. War crimes also should not be brought. The
timetable that most of these crimes occurred was after the conflict ended, and had less to
do with active combat and more to do with taking away due process rights. As such, both
should not be brought.
The Justice’s case provides ample precedent to convict the judges of the Special
Courts for individual criminal responsibility if they indeed were abusing their position of
authority. Furthermore, the members of the RCC can be held liable for superior
responsibility because they were in a position of power to stop these atrocities, but
instead encouraged them through active participation or through acquiescence, in
derogation of international customary law.
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SUMMARY ON THE ACTIVITY OF THE PEOPLE'S COURT FROM 1
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thereof those under
of age.

18 years

4. Number of days of session
thereof those outside
of Berlin .
5. Death sentences

10. Penal camp:

12. Fined:

13. Acquittals
14. Procedure suspended:
(persons)

Judge’s Trial, supra note 6, at p. 237. An example of the practices of the Nazi regime’s court system. If
numbers are comparable (or percentage of executions) the case should be strong against the RCC and the
judges. [in the accompanying notebook at Tab 13]
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